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PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS AND
*
PUBLIC LAW
By

JOHN

A.G.

GRIFFITH**

The article examines questions of public law as they apply to some of the scandals that have
affected the Thatcher regime in Britain. It looks at some of the principles which underlie
parliamentary actions and the internal machinations of Governments. Finally, the article
questions the application and development of administrative law which it seems is beset by
inconsistency and contradiction in the courts of Britain.
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I. INTRODUCTION

It may seem a little bizarre, even perverse, to speak of
principles and politics and public law together. The cynic might say
that they do not often meet in the same company, that principles
are too grand to mix with politics, or as Emma thought of Frank
Churchill: "his indifference to a confusion of rank bordered too
much on inelegance of mind." To the worldly wise, principles, at
least in politics and probably in morals also, are more a matter for
0
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the public relations people to talk about and are meant to conceal
the reality of power, of passion, and of reality. And law is another
kind of camouflage, also political under the harlequin cloth of
seeming principle.
By principle I mean to include general propositions usually
held out as desirables, even as ideals, but sometimes only as working
rules. The constitution of every country, whether it is written or not
written, is full of such principles governing such matters as collective
and Ministerial responsibility, the relations between Ministers and
civil servants, and the role of the judiciary. I am not talking
specifically about conventions, an unfortunate Diceyan invention
which only confuses students about the nature of reality. Another
part of that reality is what we call politics which for my present
purposes is meant to include what happens day by day in the
running of the Government of a country.
Principles lend themselves to rhetoric more easily than do
politics. We see the two operating side by side in international
affairs. At one level, ideological principles abound, and the citizens
of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries are
encouraged to contrast their ideals and way of life with those of the
Soviet Union to the manifest disadvantage of the latter. So also,
the citizens of the Soviet Union are similarly encouraged in the
opposite proposition. Russian mothers used to frighten their
children in the nineteenth century with the threat of the allconquering Frenchman. Nowadays, if Boney doesn't get you,
Ronnie will.
No doubt, beneath the avalanche of ideological rhetoric lies
the hard rock of economic self-interest and national selfadvancement. That looks more like politics.
But I am not going to talk about international politics. Let
me instead introduce my third character: public law.
II. PUBLIC LAW
Public law is a two-headed creation, like Janus. It is a gate
that opens two ways: towards law and towards public affairs, which
is also called politics. And public lawyers choose one way or the
other through the gate and then distribute themselves along the
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road stretching from those who are scarcely distinguishable from
political scientists (or even politicians) to those who look like
honest, common lawyers seduced by the notion that their specialty
has more than wholly private and personal relationships.
To seek to demonstrate my modest thesis that some interest
lies in looking at principles through the eyeglasses of politics and of
public law, I will concentrate on two kinds of development, one
political and one legal, which (it seems to me) touch on this matter
of so-called principle, though not to its manifest advantage.
The first is the Westland story with which some of you will
undoubtedly be familiar if, being interested in public affairs, you
have had time, from following your own politics, to look across the
Atlantic to the slowly sinking offshore island and beyond the
continent of Europe.
Here then are the bones of the story, by no means yet
finished, of political chicanery and skullduggery, of who's in and
who's out, of Cabinet Ministers and their private offices, of
Parliamentarians and Law Officers, of defence contracts, of leaks
deliberately sprung and barely concealed, of threats to send the
special branch into 10 Downing Street, and much besides, including
constitutional principles and conventions, alive and dead.
III. WESTLAND
In the early 1980s, in Europe and especially in the United
Kingdom (hereinafter UK), the civilian market for helicopters
collapsed and military orders declined. The future looked bad for
the small helicopter-producing company of Westland. It was the
only major manufacturer which was not part of a much larger group
either in North America or in Europe. Westland hoped for a large
order from India, but for 1984-85, Westland faced a pre-tax loss of
95.3 million pounds sterling.
Well over 90 percent of helicopters in service with British
forces were made by Westland for the Ministry of Defence
(hereinafter MoD). In 1985, the Ministry ordered twenty-two new
helicopters from Westland. In January 1986, an order for fifteen
Sea Kings was in prospect. Possibly another six might be ordered,
but otherwise no orders were expected from MoD before 1990-91.
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In these circumstances, Westland was in need of what we
would call help, but what the business world calls a "financial
reconstruction." Since 1967, there had been a bilateral programme
of collaboration between France and the UK over helicopter
production. In June 1975, this became an intergovernmental, four
nation Helicopter Steering Committee, with manufacturers from the
UK, France, Italy, and West Germany. In 1978, the four Defence
Ministers signed a Declaration of Principles to work together to
maintain a strong helicopter industry within Europe. There was
already a substantial involvement of American helicopter
manufacture with European producers, including the American
Sikorsky with Westland. Nor did the European helicopter industry
offer a full range of types, so Governments bought some from the
United States.
The Government first heard of Westland's financial problems
in 1984. In June 1985, the Government took the view that a public
sector rescue was not justified, and that a market solution should be
sought. Later in June, the directors of Westland approached the
Bank of England on whose introduction Sir John Cuckney became
Chair on 26 June. The Government was now informed that the
American Sikorsky were interested in "some form of participation"
in Westland. There were also discussions with the European
companies.
Mr. Leon Brittan became Secretary of State (hereinafter
SoS) for Trade and Industry on 2 September 1985, and it appears
that, certainly in October 1985, he was taking steps to ensure that
the possibilities of a European option, as well as the Sikorsky
American option, were fully explored. But Sir John Cuckney
favoured the American option and mistrusted the motives of the
European companies, all of which were Government-owned, lossmaking, and suffering from excess capacity. Mr. Michael Heseltine
was SoS for Defence, and he explored the European option with
Cabinet support. He became committed to that option. For many
weeks, there was no firm European proposal, while the Sikorsky's
bid was ready. At this time, Mr. Heseltine pulled a fast one. He
arranged for the National Armaments Directors of France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the UK to meet on 29
November. Mr. Heseltine attended this meeting which neither Sir
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John Cuckney nor Mr. Brittan knew about. The National Directors
recommended to their Governments that some of the helicopter
needs of their forces should be covered solely in the future by
helicopters designed and built in Europe. Mr. Brittan later recorded
his opinion that from this date Mr. Heseltine's enthusiasm for a
European solution to Westland's problem caused him to take action
going beyond what was consistent with the Government's policy in
relation to the handling of Westland. That policy was said to be
that the final decision was one for the Westland Board of Directors
and that the Government should not intervene. The Treasury saw
the recommendation of the National Directors as eliminating
competition. Sir John Cuckney saw it, if endorsed by Ministers, as
an insuperable obstacle to a capital reconstruction involving
Sikorsky.
From then on events gathered speed. On 6 December, a
majority of Ministers and ad hoc groups headed by the Prime
Minister (hereinafter PM) were ready to decide that the
Government should not endorse the Directors' recommendation. But
because a minority of Ministers, including Mr. Heseltine, felt very
strongly about the matter, it was decided, so the PM told the House
of Commons, to hold a meeting of the Economic Sub-Committee for
which a full paper would be prepared.
This Sub-Committee took place on 9 December. Mr.
Heseltine believed that he was given a commission to see whether
the Europeans could put together a firm proposal to the Westland
board by the following Friday evening, and that the Sub-Committee
was to meet on that Friday to receive his report. The PM denied
that there had ever been a firm commitment to a further meeting,
but only to the possibility of one. In the event, the preliminary
arrangements for the meeting were cancelled by the PM. This
stymied Heseltine. Ministers did not endorse the recommendation
of the National Directors, and the European consortium's proposal
was rejected by the Westland Board which adopted the Sikorsky
option.
Mr. Heseltine did not give up. He persisted with his
promotion of the European option even though the Cabinet had
decided to leave the decision to Westland. Now Mr. Brittan sought
to thwart Mr. Heseltine's efforts.
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Mr. Heseltine now tried to play around his "stymie." On 24
December, the MoD (that is, Mr. Heseltine) wrote to Lloyds
Merchant Bank, representing the European consortium, saying that
only by joining that consortium would Westland be in a position to
take the British share of European helicopter projects. Westland
asked the PM for clarification. Consultation took place between the
Departments of Trade and Industry, of Defence, the Treasury, and
the Solicitor-General. The PM's reply of 1 January 1986 referred
to indications from European governments and companies that a
number of projects in which Westland were expecting to participate
in co-operation with other European companies might be lost to
Westland if the Sikorsky proposals were accepted. The letter
continued that, whichever option Westland chose, the UK
Government would continue to support Westland's wish to
participate in these projects and would resist to the best of their
ability attempts by others to discriminate against Westland. This
letter was deliberately unspecific and did not include the items which
might be lost to Westland if they accepted the Sikorsky option.
This did not please Mr. Heseltine, so he suggested to those acting
for the European Consortium that they might like to ask him for
some of those details. They obliged at once in a letter of 3 January,
which was immediately replied to on the same day by the MoD and
was made public. It itemized the details which had been deliberately
omitted from the PM's letter. It had not, of course, been cleared
with the PM, other Ministers, or the Law Officers. The effect of
this letter on the PM and Mr. Brittan, said the Select Committee
1
subsequently, "can have been nothing short of incendiary."
The next day, Saturday 4 January 1986, the PM suggested to
Mr. Brittan that he should ask the Solicitor-General to consider
Heseltine's letter and give his opinion on whether it was accurate
and consistent with her letter to Westland. The Solicitor-General
reported that, on the basis of the evidence available to him, he had
formed the provisional opinion that the Defence Secretary's letter
contained material inaccuracies which needed to be corrected. Mr.
Brittan reported this to the PM who asked the Solicitor-General to

SU.K.,

H.C., "Westland plc: The Government's Decision-Making," No. 519 in Sessional

Papers (1985-86) para. 130.
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consider writing to the Defence Secretary to draw that opinion to
his attention. We are still on Saturday 4 January. At 10:20 p.m.
that night, the Solicitor-General telephoned Mr. Heseltine and
outlined his concern. Mr. Heseltine said he had no problem about
this as he had the evidence substantiating what he had written.
Nevertheless, on Monday morning 6 January, the Solicitor-General
wrote expressing concern to Mr. Heseltine and indicating the
material inaccuracies to which he had referred. Mr. Heseltine's
Office received this letter about 12 noon. Copies were sent to the
PM, the Foreign Office, the Department of Trade and Industry, and
the Treasury. Mr. Brittan's private secretary saw the copy at about
1 p.m. Westland's Chair, Sir John Cuckney, had been kept in touch
with these exciting developments the day before (Sunday) and
wanted the matter cleared up before the company's press conference
on the Monday afternoon. Knowing this, Mr. Brittan's private
secretary rang Mr. Brittan who was out for lunch and read the
Solicitor-General's letter to him. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir
Robert Armstrong, subsequently reported that the SoS (Mr. Brittan)
responded that he thought it should go into the public domain, and
that it should be done in specific terms, but that the PM's Office
should be consulted. The PM's version was that Mr. Brittan made
it clear that, subject to the agreement of her office, he was giving
authority for the disclosure to be made from the Department of
Trade and Industry, if it was not made from Downing Street. Mr.
Brittan said, "I would particularly stress, it all had to be subject to
the agreement of No. 10.,,2 Mr. Brittan did not express a view
about the method of disclosure. Mr. Brittan wanted the disclosure
to come from No. 10, but No. 10 would have none of it. But the
Trade and Industry officials believed they had No. 10's approval for
the disclosure.
Mrs. Thatcher was present at No. 10 while all this was going
on, but apparently was not consulted. The Select Committee on
Defence came to the conclusion that the press office at No. 10 (Mr.
Bernard Ingham) "undoubtedly realised the implication of what was

2 ]bid para. 147.
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about to take place and wished to
distance No. 10 and the Prime
3
Minister from the consequences."
The means of disclosure adopted was for the press officer at
Trade and Industry to telephone the Press Association and read
excerpts from the Solicitor-General's letter. The need for urgency
was said to be the Westland press conference at 4 p.m. that day.
Who decided on the means of disclosure is not clear. It is said that
Mr. Ingham at No. 10 did not give instructions to the press office at
Trade and Industry. But it is known that the press officer at the
Department thought the disclosure, or its method, was improper,
and that she wished to consult her Permanent Secretary who was
not available. The disclosure was, after all, of a classified letter,
written by another Minister who had not been asked if he
consented. In addition, the letter had been written by one of the
Law Officers whose advice has always been treated as especially
private and confidential.
The PM justified the disclosure on the ground that Westland
needed to know before the press conference on that afternoon. In
fact, the Chair of Westland was personally informed by an official
early in the afternoon. The use of the Press Association with the
consequent publicity seemed unnecessary. The Select Committee on
Defence thought that the PM's justification for publication was
4
"flimsy, to say the least."
The Solicitor-General was angry at the disclosure. The PM
said that her officials were right to consider that she would have
agreed, had she been asked, that the fact that the Solicitor-General
thought Mr. Heseltine's letter contained material inaccuracies should
be made public as soon as possible. Both she and Mr. Brittan
regretted the method adopted to go public. The selection of
extracts was made by two officials in Trade and Industry. Mr.
Brittan refused to tell the Select Committee whether he had
authorized the publication of the document, and refused to identify
the person who had selected the extracts that were published. He
also refused to say why the Solicitor-General was not told that his
3 Abil para. 155.
4 Ibid- para. 160.
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letter was going to be leaked. The Select Committee on Defences
said that:
The effect of selectively releasing the Solicitor-General's letter, was to undermine
the credibility of the advice which Mr. Heseltine had given to Lloyds Merchant
Bank and of Mr. Heseltine himself. On the evidence before me, Mr. Heseltine's
advice was correct, although in terms of the conventions of Government it was

improperly offered.

It is said that the Attorney-General was so angry at the use made
of the Law Officers that he threatened to send the police to No. 10
Downing Street to investigate the leak of the Solicitor-General's
letter, unless an inquiry were immediately set up.
On 13 January, the PM agreed that Sir Robert Armstrong
should conduct an internal inquiry into the circumstances under
which the Solicitor-General's letter became public knowledge. Some
scepticism had been expressed about this, as it would appear that
the PM's press secretary and private office must have known the
answers already. The PM told the House of Commons that she did
not know about Mr. Brittan's own role in the matter of the
disclosure until the inquiry had reported on 22 January. The Select
Committee reported, "[w]e asked Mr. Brittan when he was first
involved in discussions about releasing the information. He refused
to tell us. We also asked Mr. Brittan when he first spoke to
anybody in No. 10 about the publication of6the Solicitor-General's
letter. Mr. Brittan again refused to tell us."
At a Cabinet meeting of 9 January 1986, before the inquiry
was set up, the PM required all Ministers to refer to the Cabinet
Office, for approval, any statements they intended to make about
the Westland affair. Mr. Heseltine refused to accept this and
immediately resigned.
After the inquiry and debates in the House, Mr. Brittan
accepted full responsibility for the disclosure and for the form in
which it was made. He expressed profound regret for the manner
of the disclosure and resigned.

5 ]bid para. 175.

6 1bid para. 203.
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Let us look at how constitutional principles emerged from
this affair. The PM and perhaps a majority of the Cabinet, having
decided not to rescue Westland by the incursion of public money,
wanted the Sikorsky option to succeed, but officially said that the
matter was one for the Westland Board of Directors to decide. So
political activity had to be somewhat subterranean. If the official
policy of the Government was not to intervene, then Mr. Heseltine's
continuous efforts to set up the European option were flatly
contrary to the doctrine of collective responsibility. He was
deliberately seeking the support of Parliamentarians, the general
public, and the media. On 17 December, the word from the press
office at No. 10 Downing Street was that the PM thought Mr.
Heseltine's activities were unorthodox but in order, but the line soon
changed and became that he was breaching the doctrine of collective
responsibility. Nevertheless, he was allowed without public rebuke
to continue his campaign. The principle had to be bent because,
given all the circumstances, including the popularity of an argument
that is pro-Europe and anti-American, the PM was not in a strong
enough position to rebuke Mr. Heseltine publicly, and certainly in
no position to dismiss him. This is of course the way politics is. It
is easy to say that the PM can at any time dismiss Ministers and
that this gives the PM great power. It is not only easy to say. It is
also true. But the power to dismiss, or even to publicly rebuke, can
be used only in special circumstances. Too rigorous a use of the
power weakens the Government both in the House and in the
country. There will always be those who think the Minister is in the
right and the PM is in the wrong, and the question is one of
relative advantage. Mrs. Thatcher has not suffered from a whole
series of dismissals over the years, though she has never dismissed
a high ranking member of her Cabinet. Harold Macmillan's famous
night of the long knives, when he sacked six of the Cabinet, on the
other hand, gave a blow in loss of morale to his administration from
which it did not recover. Finally, Mrs. Thatcher was obliged to turn
the screw on Mr. Heseltine because he had become an internal
threat. I have always thought of Mr. Heseltine as Robert Devereux,
the Earl of Essex (played by Errol Flynn), whose personal challenge
was also carried too far. All this had everything to do with the
pressures of practical politics, and had nothing to do with principle.
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The deliberate release to the press of the Solicitor-General's
letter broke all conventions governing the position of Law Officers
whose advice is supposed to be totally confidential. This was a
remarkable breach of principle because it was a personal affront to
the Solicitor-General whose services the PM was using when she
asked him to consider possible discrepancies in Heseltine's letter.
Mr. Brittan's resignation is even murkier in its reasons. He
really did nothing out of line with the courses of action required by
his mistress. We know, as near as we can without having the words
from the lady's lips, that the PM wanted the Solicitor-General's
letter leaked to the press, and that she set up the whole exercise.
Who decided by what means the leak should take place is not
altogether clear, but all the evidence points to orders from the press
office at No. 10 Downing Street. We know that the press officer at
the Department of Trade and Industry, who actually contacted the
Press Association, was reluctant to do so and tried unsuccessfully to
contact her superiors in the civil service. The press office at No. 10
directly refused to authorize the leak, still less to contact the Press
Association itself, and it is assumed this was done so that the PM
would herself be able to avoid direct responsibility. Mr. Brittan was
forced to resign because he was left isolated, holding the
responsibility of the disclosure. Everyone else had disappeared.
Had the Conservative backbenchers supported him, he would have
survived because, although he was holding the responsibility, he was
not in fact responsible.
But PMs do not resign in such
circumstances. This was not then a case of the convention of
Ministerial responsibility, but rather the end of a game we used to
play in the nursery when a parcel had to be passed from hand to
hand and the last holder before the lights went up or the music
stopped was the fall guy. The Conservative backbenchers could
scarcely be expected to stand by Mr. Brittan when to do so would
have been to abandon Mrs. Thatcher to the truth.
And what about those well known principles governing the
relationship between Ministers and civil servants. For this we must
go back a little time to the Ponting affair. In July 1984 Clive
Ponting, an Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Defence sent two
documents to Tom Dalyell M.P. who passed them to Sir Anthony
Kershaw M.P. the chair of the Select Committee of the House of
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Commons on Foreign Affairs. Sir Anthony handed the documents
to the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Heseltine) who called in
the Ministry's police to investigate. Two days after the investigation
began Ponting had signed a statement admitting that he had sent
the papers to Dalyell. Ponting then resigned from the Civil Service
but was later charged under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act
1911 for communicating official information without being authorized
to do so. In February 1985 Ponting was acquitted, the jury
returning a unanimous verdict. The two documents contained
information about the sinking of the cruiser Belgrano in May 1982
during the Falklands conflict. Ponting claimed that his justification
for disclosing the documents was that he believed Members of
Parliament were being deliberately misled by Ministerial statements
about the sinking of the cruiser and that it was his duty to reveal
this.7 On 16 February 1985, the head of the Home Civil Service
(Sir Robert Armstrong) issued a note of guidance stating the duties
and responsibilities of civil servants to Ministers. The note was
issued after consultation with permanent secretaries in charge of
Departments, with their agreement, and with the consent of the PM.
Having stated the general principles governing the conduct of civil
servants and having emphasized that the duty of the individual civil
servant was first and foremost to the Minister in charge of the
Department, the note continued:
Civil servants should not decline to take, or abstain from taking, an action merely
because to do so would conflict with their personal opinions on matters of political

choice or judgment between alternative or competing objectives and benefits; they
should consider the possibility of declining only if taking or abstaining from the
action in question is felt to be directly contrary to deeply held personal conviction
on a fundamental issue of conscience.
A civil servant who feels that to act or to abstain from acting in a particular
way, or to acquiesce in a particular decision or course of action, would raise for

him or her a fundamental issue of conscience, or is so profoundly opposed to a
policy as to feel unable conscientiously to administer it in accordance with the
standards described in this note, should consult a superior officer, or in the last
resort the Permanent Head of the Home Civil Service. If that does not enable the

matter to be resolved on a basis which the civil servant concerned is able to accept,

7For his own account, see Clive Ponting, The Right to Know (London: Sphere Books
Limited, 1985). And see U.K., H.C., ParliamentaryDebates, 6th ser., vol. 73, col. 733-826 (18
February 1985).
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he or she must either carry out his or her instructions or resign from the public
service - though even after resignation he or she will still be bound to keep the
confidences to which he or she has become privy as a civil servant 8

This note does not cover the situation in which Mr. Brittan's civil
servants found themselves during the Westland affair when ordered
to disclose to the press the contents of the letter from the SolicitorGeneral to the SoS for Defence (Mr. Heseltine).9 The note does
not make clear whether those civil servants were entitled to refuse
to make the disclosure in this way if they thought it would be
improper (though not illegal) to do so, especially when they did not
have the opportunity to consult superior officers.
Lord Hooson asked some of these questions in a debate in
the House of Lords (hereinafter HL) on 26 February 1986:
What are the duties, if any, of civil servants to Parliament? Do they owe any duty
to Parliament if Ministers lie and a civil servant knows that it is a lie? Do they
owe any duty to Parliament if the Minister refuses to be answerable to Parliament?
In other words, what are the limits of a civil servant's duty to Government? 1 0

The answers are not clear.
The Armstrong Memorandum, as it came to be known, led
to much discussion, and the Select Committee on the Treasury and
the Civil Service in 1985 appointed a sub-committee to inquire into
the duties and responsibilities of civil servants and Ministers.11 The
Committee was critical of the Memorandum and found it remarkable
that it should be considered an appropriate answer to today's
problems. Observing that loyalty should not be a one way street,
the Committee recommended that the PM should, after consultation
with the leaders of the other political parties represented in the
House of Commons, formulate and publish guidelines for Ministers
which would set out their duties to Parliament and responsibilities

8 See U.K, H.C., ParliamentaryDebates, 6th ser., vol. 74, col. 128-30, (26 February 1985),
as amended in vol. 84, col. 193 (24 October 1985).
9 See text at 9-10.
10 U.K., H.L., ParliamentaryDebates, 5th ser., vol. 471, col. 1088-1122, at col. 1093.
11 See U.K., H.C., "Civil Servants and Ministers: Duties and Responsibilities" No. 921,11 in Sessional Papers (1985-86).
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for the civil service. 12 The Committee also recommended that the
Head of the Home Civil Service should enter into discussions with
the Civil Service Trade Unions with a view to producing an agreed
text of a new note of guidance for civil servants.1 3 They emphasized
that Ministers should be able to play an active role in selecting the
key officials who were going to work with them in planning and
implementing their policies, and generally encouraged the "infusions,
temporary and permanent," of highly motivated people of proven
ability into the higher Civil Service.14 Specifically, on the issue that
gave rise to the Memorandum, the Select Committee said that they
could not regard as justified any leak by a civil servant which was
designed to frustrate the policies or actions of a Minister, and that
civil servants who15leaked information "should face the sack or
internal discipline."
In June 1986, the Association of First Division Civil Servants
adopted a Code of Ethics which it proposed should be incorporated
in the civil service pay and conditions of service code. The Code of

Ethics provided for the recording of advice by the civil servant of
any instruction believed by the Department's legal advisors to be
likely to be unlawful, in breach of treaty obligations; or where a civil
servant was required to act in a way which misled members of the
public as to their rights, or in other ways amounted to
maladministration. The Code also provided that civil servants with
professional responsibilities should refuse to take action which
conflicted with their professional code of conduct, or where a
professional civil servant was instructed to take action damaging to
the public interest (for example, in matters of health and safety).

Again, civil servants should record their advice where they
considered they were being asked to assist Ministers in misleading or

12 The Government did not accept this proposal: see U.K., H.C., "Civil Servants and

Ministers: Duties and Responsibilities," Cmnd. 9841 in Sessional Papers(1985-86) para. 10-12.
13 The Government said Sir Robert Armstrong would discuss this with the civil service
unions: ibid para 16-18.
14 The Government did not accept this: ibid para 21-25, 26-28.
15 Supra, note 11 at para. 6,10.
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lying to Parliament. If the matter could not otherwise be settled,
the code would enable a civil servant to bring it before an
independent body such as a Select Committee of Parliament or an
ombudsman.
The Select Committee on Defence ended its report on the
Westland affair in July 1986 by inviting anyone who felt traduced by
the findings of the committee to give oral or written evidence, in
public or private, to the Committee. 16
The First Division
Association protested that if any civil servants took up this offer
they would be in breach of the code of conduct laid down by Sir
Robert Armstrong which stated that their duty was "first and
foremost" to their Ministers.
Responding to the Select Committee, the Government
proposed to make clear to civil servants giving evidence to Select
Committees that they should not answer questions which were or
appeared to be directed to the conduct of themselves or of other
named individual civil servants.1 7 In a subsequent debate, the
Leader of the House (John Biffen) indicated that there could be
further discussion before new guidelines to civil servants were finally
and formally issued.18
The Treasury and Civil Service Committee responded with a
report on Ministers and Civil Servants.19 They distinguished
"actions" of civil servants from their "conduct," defining "actions" as
those activities which were carried out on the instructions of, or
were consistent with the policies of, the Minister concerned. They
noted that Select Committees regularly took evidence from officials
concerning their actions, and they had no doubt that it would be
quite wrong and entirely unacceptable for any restriction to be
placed on the giving of such evidence. The Select Committee
16 Supra, note 1 at para. 237, 239-40.
17 U.K., H.C., "Westland plc: The Defence Implications of the Future of Westland plc"
and "Westland plc: The Government's Decision-Making," Cmnd. 9916 in Sessional Papers
(1985-86), para. 44.
18 U.K., H.C., ParliamentaryDebates, 6th ser., vol. 103, col. 339-420, at 415-16 (29

October 1986).
19 U.K., H.C., "Ministers and Civil Servants," No. 62 in Sessional Papers (1986-87).
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defined "conduct" as activities falling outside their definition of
"actions;" such "conduct" might amount to misconduct. They agreed
that it would only on rare occasions be necessary for Select
Committees to investigate "conduct."
The Liaison Committee of the House of Commons also
reported a few days later on the accountability of Ministers and civil
servants. The Liaison Committee accepted the distinction between
"actions" and "conduct," at least to the extent of agreeing that a
Select Committee finding something amiss in conduct would pursue
the matter with the Minister before reporting to the House. They
recommended that the guidelines proposed by the Leader of the
House should not be issued. Drawing on their experience in the
Westland affair, the Liaison Committee asked for an undertaking
that, in the future, the Government would always ensure that a
20
Minister was accountable to the appropriate Select Committee.
The Government replied to both these reports.21 They
accepted that if civil servants giving evidence to a Select Committee
were unable to answer a question to the Committee's satisfaction
because they were inhibited by their duty to, or the instructions of,
Ministers, the relevant Departmental Minister should be prepared to
attend the Committee. The Government also accepted that there
was intention to place restrictions on the giving of the evidence
about "actions" subject to national security, confidentiality, and the
preservation of collective responsibility.
To their reply, the Government appended supplementary
guidelines for officials giving evidence to Departmental Select
Committees. These stated that civil servants were accountable to
Ministers, and that Ministers were accountable to Parliament. So
civil servants were subject to the instructions of Ministers and
remained bound to observe their duty of confidentiality to Ministers.
When questions appeared to be directed to the "conduct" of
individual civil servants, carrying the implication of allocating
individual criticism or blame, it was for the Minister to make inquiry
20 U.K., H.C., "Accountability of Ministers and Civil Servants to Select Committees of
the House of Commons" No. 100 in Sessional Papers(1986-87).

21 U.K., H.C., "Accountability of Ministers and Civil Servants" Cmnd. 78 ifi Sessional
Papers (1986-87).
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and to inform the Select Committee what had happened and what
had been done to put the matter right and to prevent a recurrence.
Here again the pressure of politics on principle became
acute.
The PM clearly hoped to re-assert her overall and
comprehensive control over civil servants, whom she appears to
regard as her own personal domestics. But the Leader of the
House, although a Cabinet Minister, was not willing to adopt quite
so rigorous an approach, especially when Select Committees of the
House of Commons were part of the argument. As it happens, both
the Leader (Mr. Biffen) and the principal spokesman for the
Committees (Mr. Terence Higgins) are men of considerable political
experience and personal integrity. And so the simple principle that
civil servants should do as Ministers tell them, should seldom be
seen and never heard, has given way to a political compromise
under which Select Committees may still question them closely and
will expect them to continue to be accountable within the limits of
their constitutional role.
No sooner had the last of these interchanges occurred in
February 1987 than the Government was plunged into another
constitutional crisis. In October 1986, according to the PM, it
became clear to the Government that a British Broadcasting
Corporation (hereinafter BBC) television programme to be shown
in the near future would deal with specific material on a secret
defence project known as Zircon satellite. This programme was one
of a series called "The Secret Society," written by Duncan Campbell,
a well known journalist of the New Statesman. Later the BBC
decided not to broadcast this programme. Following press reports
on 18 January that the film would be given a private showing, the
Attorney-General on 21 January applied for an ex parte injunction
against Duncan Campbell. This was granted. Further press reports
suggested that two Members of Parliament (hereinafter MPs)
intended to show the film in a room in the House of Commons on
22 January. To prevent this, the Attorney-General applied for a
second injunction to the same judge, but this was refused on the
ground that the House should regulate its own proceedings.
Application was then made to the Speaker of the House of
Commons who ordered that the film should not be shown in rooms
under the control of the House until the House had an opportunity
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to discuss the matter. On 27 January, the House debated a
Government motion to confirm the Speaker's order and continue
that order so long as the injunction granted against Duncan
Campbell remained in effect.
A question that immediately arose affected the power of
Select Committees. The Leader of the House (Mr. Biffen) said that
under the terms of the motion it would be open to a Select
Committee, should the occasion arise, to apply to the House for
authority to see the film within the precincts of the House if it felt
that was necessary for the proper conduct of its inquiries. He
assured the House that if that were required the Government would
act promptly to provide time for the House to reach a decision on
such a request. The Chair of the Committee, which acts as a
Liaison for all the Select Committees, referred to a question put the
previous week to the Leader of the House: "[w]hen my right hon.
Friend considers the terms of the motion, will he ensure there is
nothing in it that might impair the rights of the Select Committees
of the House?" To which the Leader then replied: "I can give the
undertaking sought by my hon. Friend in respect of Select
22
Committees."
The Chair of the Liaison Committee now asked the Leader
to repeat, without qualification, that assurance. But the Leader
would go no further than his promise to give time for a debate, and
it may be that the PM did not wholly approve of the statement he
had made the previous week. The Leader of the Opposition also
pressed the Leader. So did others.
In the event, the Government motion was not put, but a
motion to refer the matter to the Committee of Privileges was
approved without a division. The Speaker told the House that he
understood this to mean that his decision forbidding the showing of
the film within the precincts of the House stood until the
Committee of Privileges reported to the House and the House took
a decision.
It is clear that relationships between the Select Committees
of the House and the Government are becoming more and more
contentious. It is not always realized how strong a hold the
22 U.K., H.C., ParliamentaryDebates, 6th ser., vol. 109, col. 219 (27 January 1987).
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Government has over what goes on in the House and in its
Committees. This is because of the hold the Government has over
its supporters, partly because of tradition and partly because the
Whips have the means to enforce discipline. Nevertheless, this is
not wholly and inevitably true. Members are on occasion ready to
defy the Whips.
The conflict between the Executive and the Commons is
perennial but always changing. It is conditioned by the Executive's
majority in the House, but also by a consciousness, which
Government backbenchers are also aware of, that Governments
need watching. If Government backbenchers could always be relied
on to do as they were told by Government Whips, the pressures on
the Government would be much less. And outside the House,
public opinion may emerge on any particular issue that is critical of
Government action. And when this happens, it feeds back through
Members of Parliament. Members in their debates do provide copy
for the press and television. But the activity is two-way.
Here principle and politics become indistinguishable. It is
not true to say simply that in principle Parliament is sovereign, but
in political practice the Executive controls Parliament through its
majority. This has never been true. The only senses in which
Parliament is sovereign are that the assent of both Houses is needed
before a new law in the shape of an Act of Parliament can be
made, and that a defeat in the House of Commons on a matter of
confidence brings down a Government and forces a general election.
In all other senses, the Queen's Ministers are sovereign. They may,
it is true, do only those things for which they have legal authority,
derived from statutes made by Parliament, or by virtue of the royal
prerogative. But the making of policy and its execution are
essentially matters for Her Majesty's Ministers. That is principle as
well as political practice.
I turn now to another example: that of principle and politics
in adjudication.
IV. PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN ADJUDICATION
An example of the conflict between principle and politics will
be familiar to the lawyers amongst you. When Mr. Liversidge was
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interned without trial in 1940 under the Defence Regulations then
in force, he sought to challenge his detention on the ground that
the power of the Home Secretary was conditional on the Home
Secretary having reasonable cause to believe that he had hostile
associations. The HL decided, however, that it was sufficient if the
Home Secretary thought he had reasonable cause, and if no
objective challenge on the existence or otherwise of reasonable
cause itself was permissible. This decision was come to, no doubt,
in the public interest, for the pragmatic political reason that
whatever the words of the Defence Regulations, we could not allow
legal niceties to threaten national survival in time of war. Lord
Atkin dissented in the most famous dissenting judgment of the
century in the UK. "In this country, amid the clash of arms," he
said:
the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language
in war as in peace. It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the

principles of liberty for which on recent authority we are now fighting, that the
judges are no respecters of persons and stand between the subject and any

attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any
coercive action is justified in law. In this case I have listened to arguments which

might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of King's Bench in the time of
Charles I.23

It seems to me clear that the majority were concerned above
all to ensure that the Executive was not impeded in the successful
prosecution of any war in which His Majesty might be engaged.
This is hardly a dishonourable purpose. And the apparent starkness
of the conflict between principle and political expediency in this case
is perhaps misleading. Lord Atkin did not believe that his view, if
adopted, would endanger the war effort significantly. The majority
perhaps thought that, in the circumstances, their underwriting of
Executive power was not a severe inroad into the principle of
individual liberty. A cynic might say that the outcome of the case
was a typical example of the British genius for compromise or,
alternatively, for hypocrisy. After all, in the end, Mr. Liversidge and
people similarly interned remained locked up while at the same time
we were presented with a ringing declaration of individual liberty.

23 Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1941), [19421 A.C. 206 at 244, [1941] 3 All E.R. 338.
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It reminds me of that large number of cases on habeas corpus where
judges begin by extolling the virtue of this great writ which
epitomizes the dedication of the British people to freedom, liberty,
and individual rights, and end by finding special reasons why in the
particular case before them, the incarcerated must stay incarcerated.
I want, however, to address a much more difficult problem
in public law - perhaps the most difficult in this article. In the last
twenty years or so, we have been told by members of the senior
judiciary on many occasions that administrative law is now an O.K.
subject, that judicial review is a good thing so long as it is exercised
in moderation, and that if we watch closely we shall see the
emergence of comprehensive legal principles.
Already the
vocabulary is being introduced and we are judicially encouraged to
use words like irrationality, illegality, and procedural impropriety.
I want to suggest that this much heralded development of
legal principle has in fact largely failed to materialize and indeed
that there is some evidence to indicate that Her Majesty's judges are
a long way from recognizing the principles of public law. The fault
cannot be wholly theirs. It must in part be ours (by which I mean
legal academics), and this is nonetheless so despite our knowledge
that they would consider what we have to say on the matter at best
with condescension and at worst with scorn. I have reluctantly come
to the conclusion that the judges of the High Court and above in
England do not believe they have much to learn from anyone except
their judicial superiors and sometimes their political peers. As
almost none of them has ever progressed in the study of the law
beyond their first degrees, and some of them not beyond bar finals
set forty or more years previously, it is perhaps not surprising we
look in vain for them to lead the way in the development of
comprehensive principles in the field of public law.
The contrast between the views of academic lawyers and the
judiciary on the nature and development of administrative law is
striking and says a great deal about the two professions.
Let us remember that the present political dispute began
nearly sixty years ago with the publication of Robson's Justice and
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Administrative Law24 in 1928 and Lord Hewart's The New
Despotism25 in 1929. This was followed, on the academic side, by
Sir Ivor Jennings' Law and the Constitution26 in 1933. Much of the
discussion was about the development of a system of administrative
law. There were many decisions handed down, with the courts
generally seeking to extend their jurisdiction and getting bogged
down in conceptual distinctions between judicial, quasi-judicial, and
administrative functions, with occasional dashes for freedom in
pursuit of error of law on the face of the record. Then was
supposed to come the great breakthrough. When we heard the
famous words of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin in 1964, "[w]e do
not have a developed system of administrative law - perhaps
because until recently we did not need it...," 27 we were struck with
a sense of wonder that the persistent failure of Her Majesty's judges
over so long a period of muddle and uncertainty could be explained
in such terms. It was, I suppose, absurd on our part to have
thought for a moment that they might have been aware of the
attempts of academic writers to construct such a system. But
nothing was quite so absurd as the claim made a few years later in
O'Reilly v. Macknan by Lord Diplock that this reproach to English
by 1977 we did have a developed
law had been removed and 2that
8
system of administrative law.
It is difficult to disentangle principle, or the lack of it, from
politics, or the pursuit of it, in this matter. I recently attended a
lecture given in a University in the UK by a Lord Justice of the
Court of Appeal. He was talking about the new judicial review
procedure brought in by Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme

24 William Alexander Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, 3d ed. (Westport, Conn.:

Greenwood Press, 1970).
25 Lord Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism, (London: E. Benn, 1929).
26 Sir W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of
London Press, 1961).
27

Pdge v. Baldwin (1963), [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 at 76 (H.L.(E.)), [1964] A.C. 40.

28 O'Reilly v. Mackman (1982), [1983] 2 A.C. 237 at 279 (H.L.(E.)), [1982] 3 All E.R.
1124.
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Court. The Lord Justice was alarmed because the number of
applications for judicial review had greatly increased over a four year
period because of this reform so that the courts were becoming
overcrowded and delay was growing. To deal with this outburst of
popularity brought about by the reform, Her Majesty's judges moved
the goal posts so as to make it more difficult for applicants to bring
their cases. In particular, two types of applicant who felt they were
suffering injustice had to be discouraged. These two categories were
homeless persons and immigrants. The change in the rules largely
excluded them from the remedy. Here the politics does seem clearly
to have got the upper hand over the principle. But we are still
looking for that system of administrative law. This search sometimes
seems like a cross between Sir Galahad seeking the Holy Grail and
Glenn Miller seeking that distinctive sound. However, since both
were ultimately successful, so perhaps shall we.
Just what the courts ought to be doing in this field is the big
question. Some people think that they should be doing very little,
and that they will find solutions in the expansion of democratic
institutions and in their more efficient functioning.
It is a
respectable position. But standards of conduct, even amongst locally
elected administrative authorities, are not always perfect, and it may
not be altogether realistic to believe that these can be maintained by
the working of the democratic processes.
The learned editor of Public Law29 recently drew attention
to a simple little case and its handling by the Court of Appeal in
London. It shows what kind of public law we have, and we must
consider whether it is what we want, whether these are proper
principles, and what are the political implications. The case is called
1 v. Lancashire County Council ex parte Huddleston.30 The
applicant was a young woman of eighteen years of age in 1983. Her
parents are UK citizens and she was born in the UK. She has a
UK passport and is entitled to live in the UK. In 1970, at age of
five, she went to Hong Kong (hereinafter HK) with her parents.

29 See A.W. Bradley, "Openness, Discretion and Judicial Review" [1986] P.L. 508.
30

R v. LancashireCounty Council exparte Huddleston, [1986] 2 All E.R. 941, [1986] NLJ

Rep 562.
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There she lived until June 1983 when she became resident in
Lancashire. Her father is Lancastrian born and bred. He is a
chartered electrical engineer, and until 1970 had always lived in or
not far from Lancashire. Then he went to work in HY. He sold
his house in Lancashire and lived with his family in quarters
provided by his employers on terms that he would vacate them when
his employment ended. He wished to return to work in the UK
when he could get a job and would have returned earlier had the
employment position been better. In 1977, he bought a house in
Lancashire and furnished it. The family occupied the house each
year during his leave. So he had been a local ratepayer since 1977,
and he also voluntarily kept up his national insurance payments in
the UK
In 1983, his daughter Lynne, the applicant, was minded to
take a B.Sc. in psychology at Bedford College, London. She applied
for a mandatory grant from her local education authority
(hereinafter LEA), that is, Lancashire County Council. This she
would have been entitled to had she been "ordinarily resident" for
the last three years, or if her father was "temporarily employed"
outside the UKY
The Court of Appeal held she had not been "ordinarily
resident" for three years and that her father's employment outside
the UK had not been temporary.
The EducationAct 196232 also provides that an LEA may in
its discretion bestow an award on any person where that person is
Having been refused a
not eligible for a mandatory award.
mandatory award, Lynne Huddleston applied for a discretionary
grant.
Sir John Donaldson, Master of the Rolls (hereinafter MR),
said:
Although we were assured, and I fully accept, that some consideration was given to
the grant of a discretionary award ... there is no outward and visible sign of this in
the contemporary correspondence and I am driven to conclude that any such

31 !bia at 943.
32

Education Act 1962 (U.K.) 10 & 11 Eliz 2, c. 12.
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33

After these proceedings were begun, the Chair of the further
education subcommittee reconsidered the application, and an
officer's affidavit stated:
Having considered the circumstances of this case and having been informed that

local education authorities do not receive reimbursement from central government
of 90 percent of their expenditure under the specific grant arrangements, the said

Chairman, on behalf of the County Council, felt3 4 that there were no special
circumstances to justify him making such an award.

The reference to 90 percent is that that is the amount recoverable
from the central Government on mandatory awards.
The MR said he did not find this reply wholly satisfactory.
Counsel for the Lancashire City Council argued that it might be an
undesirable practice to give full, or perhaps any, reasons to every
applicant, if only because this would be likely to lead to endless
arguments. Sir John said that if an applicant could satisfy a judge
that the facts disclosed were sufficient to entitle the applicant to
apply for judicial review, the duty of the respondent was to make
full and fair disclosure. He said that the development of judicial
review had created a new relationship between the courts and public
authorities, one of partnership based on a common aim, namely the
maintenance of the highest standards of public administration.
Public authorities must discharge their duties in accordance with
public law. The courts respected the fact that it was not for them
to intervene in the administrative field, unless there was a reason to
inquire whether a particular authority had failed to discharge its
duties in accordance with public law.
It was for the applicant, said the MR, to satisfy the court of
her entitlement to judicial review. But it was a process which fell
to be conducted with all the cards face upwards on the table, and
the vast majority of the cards would start in the hands of the public
authority.
The judges who man the public law court are, or very soon become, specialists with
a very real appreciation of the realities of public administration.... But authorities

Supra, note 30 at 944.
34 !bid
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assist neither themselves nor the courts, if their response is a blanket 'assertion
of
5
having acted in accordance with law or one which begs the question

The MR went on to say that the LEA was entitled to have
regard to the cost to the ratepayers. It was also entitled to take
into account the means of the father, his Lancastrian connections,
that he was a ratepayer, how long he had been working overseas
and his declared intention that this was temporary, and the
applicant's personal circumstances and academic achievements. At
this point in the judgment, the applicant may have been optimistic.
Judicial criticism of the LEA had been severe. But the MR
suddenly concluded with these words:
However, in the absence of such further and more detailed explanation, we have to
decide whether on the materials which we have the authority erred in the exercise
of its discretion. Although I would have liked
more reassurance, I am not satisfied
36
that it did and I would dismiss the appeal.

Now this is surely a dog's breakfast of a judgment from the
MR. Whether or not a UK citizen who resides abroad in these
circumstances should be entitled as of right to a university grant is
a matter of policy, and the two criteria of residence in the UK and
the permanence or otherwise of parental overseas employment, are
politically defensible. As criteria, they are indisputable in the courts,
being statutory. The court's application of those criteria to the facts
in this case is also defensible. So we come to what happened to the
application for a discretionary award.
The MR began by saying that the first consideration by the
LEA of the application was "cursory and inadequate."37 He said of
the second consideration put forward in the affidavit that it was not
"wholly satisfactory."38 He did not comment on the argument that
it might have been undesirable for the LEA to give reasons for
rejecting applications because this might lead to endless arguments,
35 Ibid at 945.
36 Ibid at 946.
37 Ibid. at 944.
38 Ibid.
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though I would have thought the classic argument of the bad
bureaucrat could have at least produced a judicial raising of the
eyebrows. At this point, the MR becomes difficult to follow. He
said that if an applicant could satisfy a judge that the facts disclosed
were sufficient to entitle the applicant to apply for judicial review
(and here, by definition, they were sufficient), then the duty of the
respondent was to make full and fair disclosure. As he had already
concluded that consideration of the application was cursory, the
examination was inadequate, and the reasons were unsatisfactory,
either the decision was bad on those grounds or more disclosure was
called for. He claimed that the development of judicial review had
created a new relationship between courts and public authorities
with a common aim of maintaining the highest standards of
administration. This was news to me, but if it were so, and the
courts were no longer playing the old adversarial game of who can
prove what, never mind the truth of the matter, then we certainly
need full and fair disclosure. He said that the process of judicial
review required all cards to be placed face upwards, which clearly
they were not in this case. He said authorities should not make
blanket assertions or beg questions, which the LEA had done in this
case. He listed some relevant considerations about the applicant
and her father, with no indication on the evidence that they had
been taken into account. And then he came to the conclusion that
in the absence of all this information he had to decide whether on
the materials which he had, the LEA had erred in the exercise of its
discretion. And although, he said, he would have liked more
reassurance, he was not satisfied that the LEA had erred, and so
would dismiss the appeal.
Whatever happened to full and fair disclosure? Whatever
happened to cards being face upwards on the table? Whatever
happened to no blanket assertions and no begged questions? And
above all, whatever happened to the new relationship, to the
common aim, to the maintenance of the highest standards of public
administration?
You may think I have spent too long on this case, that it is
too flimsy a basis on which to mount an attack. But for me, in this
area of judicial decision making, it raises the most crucial questions
of principle, of politics, and of public law. Let us assume, as we
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may fairly do, that this application for public money was received
and rejected first of all by a fairly junior officer who had been told
that the LEA had decided as a matter of policy, given their relative
impoverishment, that applicants who did not qualify for mandatory
awards for first degrees were not to be given discretionary awards.
It is well known that discretionary awards are very difficult to come
by. So at that stage, none of the particular circumstances were
looked at. Alternatively, the junior officer might have been told to
put up only those applications which had certain features. We can
go on to assume that, when the issue was known to be possibly
coming to court, the policy decision was taken not to spell out the
reasons why the particular circumstances of this applicant were
regarded as insufficient to merit an award, but to put up an affidavit
which said the absolute minimum; and that one of the reasons for
this reticence was that otherwise a precedent might be created in
which the officers might have to give reasoned replies and not just
rejections based on "cursory and inadequate" consideration.
Now the question is, do we want the courts to do anything
about this? In particular, do we want them to insist that evidence
is produced of how much genuine consideration was given to the
application? If we want the courts to get full and fair disclosure,
with cards face upwards, what do we want them to do - this is the
next big question - when they decide that the high standards of
public administration have not been achieved? In this case, do we
want the courts to decide that Lynne Huddleston should be given
her grant? Or do we want only that the case should be sent back
to the LEA for reconsideration of all the relevant facts as indicated
by the courts?
I do not want the courts to be able to exercise the discretion
vested in the LEA. But I would be happy if the courts were able
to insist on reasons being given so that they might consider whether
those reasons were serious. In this case, the affidavit disclosed one
reason which by itself was clearly inadequate, and if it stood alone
was probably illegal and ultra vires. I mean that whereas mandatory
grants were 90 percent financed by the central government,
discretionary grants were not. To turn down all applications on that
ground could not amount to a proper exercise of discretion. The
other consideration taken into account - it can hardly be called a
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reason - was "the circumstances of this case"39 and the decision that
they were not "special."40 On the face of it, they look "special." If
they are not, what might be "special?" I believe the courts should
intervene to the extent that they insist on full disclosure, if need be
on cross-examination of affidavit evidence, even calling witnesses
themselves if neither side shows any inclination to do so.
My general reaction to this decision is how extraordinarily
weak it is. Where is all that forthrightness and boldness which
enabled courts to strike down the Ministerial finding in Secretary of
State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough
Council41 that an LEA had acted unreasonably, or to decide that the
Greater London Council (hereinafter GLC) had betrayed the trust
placed in its hands by its ratepayers in providing them with cheaper
transport fares? 42 But the second reaction, after a few moments'
reflection, is that the decision was not so much lacking in fortitude
as being wholly consistent with the general pattern of inconsistency.
Indeed,
Its honour rooted in dishonour stood
And faith, unfaithful, kept it falsely true.
For against those cases of judicial boldness in standing up for the
individual against the mightiest in the land - well not so much the
individual in the Taneside43 case, but rather another political party,
and not so much the individual in the GLC case,44 but rather
another political party, but no matter - we can find the judiciary not
standing up against the mightiest in the land in the Secretaiy of State
1bid at 945.
40 bid at 944.
41 Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council,
[1977] AC. 1014 [hereinafter Tameside].
42

Broinley London Borough Council v. GreaterLondon Council, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62.

43 Supra, note 41.
44 Supra, note 42.
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for Defence v. GuardianNewspapers Ltd case 45 and not requiring an
adequate affidavit from the SoS for Defence before requiring the
Guardian newspaper to disclose its sources, and not protecting
freedom of the press in the thalidomide case,46 or in British Steel
Coiporation v. Granada Television Ltd,4 7 or in Harriet Harman's
case,48 and coming as close as was possible to emasculating habeas
coipus without actually performing the operation. So it does seem
that while occasionally the lions under the throne may roar they are
most likely to be found doing so as watchdogs protecting the throne.
Another recent case poses the problem of what we want our
judges to do in a slightly different situation. For many years now,
certainly since 1979 - a date which is beginning to look like the
beginning of political history before which it is assumed nothing
happened, and whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary - Her Majesty's Government has been trying to stop local
authorities from spending money on social services. First the
Government asked them not to. Then, when they took no notice,
the Government reduced the central grant. When local authorities,
or some of them, promptly increased their local tax, the Government
further penalized them. Then the Government put a limit on the
level of local tax - the famous rate-capping exercise - and finally

capped their total expenditure.
The mechanism for all this was very complicated and the
ingenuity of local treasurers quite remarkable. Creative accounting
became the thing everyone was into. One casualty, if that's the
word, was the normal distinction between capital and revenue
expenditure. The future has been heavily mortgaged by borrowing
money at high rates of interest under arrangements whereby no part
of the capital or interest is repayable for the first few years.

45 Secretary of Statefor Defence v. GuardianNewspapers Ltd, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 986, [1984]
3 All E.R. 601.
46

Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [1974] A.C. 273.

47

Bitish Steel Corporationv. Granada Television Ltd, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774, [1981] A.C.

1096.
48 Home Office v. Hannan, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 310.
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Thereafter, a fairy godmother is confidently expected to appear,
possibly heavily disguised as Mr. Roy Hattersley, the next Labour
Chancellor. This of course involves Labour first winning a general
election. In this case, I am not sure I would personally put my
money where my mouth is.
In a case last year, 49 Nottinghamshire County Council
(hereinafter NCC) sought judicial review of a Ministerial decision
which bore heavily on the finances of that authority as a result of a
distinction made between high spending and low spending local
authorities. The arguments were two. First, the NCC argued that
the Minister could not so distinguish because the Act5 ° said the
principles were to be applicable to all authorities. This the HL held
did not stop the Minister from doing what he did. Secondly, the
NCC argued that the Minister had acted unreasonably because the
application of the principles was disproportionately disadvantageous
to high spenders.
The Law Lords, led by Lord Scarman, held that in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, such as bad faith, improper
motive, or that the consequences were so absurd that the Minister
must have taken leave of his senses, it was inappropriate for the
court to intervene on the ground of unreasonableness in a matter of
public financial administration that had been one for the political
judgment of the Minister and the House of Commons (which had
approved the regulations by resolution), the principles being
concerned with the limits of public expenditure and the incidence of
the tax burden between central and local tax payers.
Lord Scarman was at some pains to insist on the
constitutional importance of his opinion. He seemed to want to
elevate what he was saying into the putting down of markers on the
boundary line between judicial principle and political rule making.
His reluctance to have the courts intervene on matters of public
financial administration and the distribution of the tax burden
between central and local taxpayers, looks very odd when compared
49 NottinghamshireCounty Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment (1985), [1986]
2 W.L.R. 1.
SO Local Govemment Planningand Land Act 1980, 1980, (U.K.) c. 65 as am. by Local
Government FinanceAct 1982, 1982 (U.K.) c. 32, s. 8, s. 59(6)(cc)(11A).
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with his opinion in the GLC transport fares case 51 when the Lords
showed positive enthusiasm for such intervention.
What all this represents is probably no more than one of the
seasonal swings that are inevitable when questions of public law are
decided, not on principle, but on mood and idiosyncrasy. From time
to time, the senior judiciary gambol about like septuagenarians on
a spree and lash into Governments and political policies with
abandon and high spirits. They will invoke political philosophers to
curb the political aspirations of party politicians. At other times,
they adopt the solemn faces of elder statesmen and step most
circumspectly around propositions that they should uphold the claims
of individuals against Ministers of the Crown.
Perhaps I am being a little unfair in suggesting that these
swings in judicial pronouncement are wholly without principle. But
it is certain that the principles are not those of treating all persons
as equal before the law.
So we come to the final question in this consideration of
adjudication: what should be the judicial principles in public law?
What are judges for?
First, they should insist on procedures being fair, and that
means that the rules of procedure hold a balance evenly between
the contestants. Secondly, they should ensure that public authorities
achieve a high standard of administration, that they come to their
decisions, to use the old words of Lord Halsbury in 1891, "according
to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion,
It is to be not arbitrary, vague,
according to law and not humour.
52
regular."
and
legal
but
fanciful
To know when to intervene and when not to intervene, to
know how to intervene and to what extent to intervene, in the
review of the decisions and actions of public authorities, from PMs
and Foreign Secretaries to minor local government officials, the
courts should seek to know all the facts, they should try to find out
the truth of the matter, and not be content necessarily with what
counsel choose to put before them.

SSupra, note 42.
52 Sharp v. Wakefield, [1891] AC. 173 at 179.
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When they look at an exercise of public power by public
authorities, they should ask the question: Is it well done?
I am aware that the laying down of general principles leaves
all the marginal questions open. About those the arguments are
perennial and will remain so. There will always be differences
between rational people about the desirable extent of judicial
intervention. But the real problem today, as it seems to me, is that
the senior courts in the UK are not performing well. Their job
requires them to go beyond procedural matters and to determine
where the public interest lies. But if judges are to develop a system
of public law wherein the elements of political decision making on
the one hand, and judicial policing of the administration on the
other, are combined so that (at least) a high standard of public
administration is achieved, the courts must make themselves aware
of the nature and extent of administrative activity to a far greater
degree than they do at present. The rules they apply must originate
in a real understanding of public administration so that public law
takes its place as an actor, in a supporting rather than a principal
role, but an actor nevertheless, in the unending conflict between
principles and politics.

